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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A UNITARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 
by Keith Hayton, Centre for Planning, University of Strathclyde 
Introduction 
The 1989 Local Government and Housing Act gave 
local authorities in England and Wales a specific 
power to carry out economic development. At the 
time the legislation was going through Parliament it 
was said that more time was to be allowed for the 
formulation of separate proposals for Scotland 
(House of Commons Official Report, 1989, Column 
837). It is now proposed that an economic 
development power will be introduced as part of the 
wholesale changes that Scottish local government 
reform will bring about from April 1996. 
Unfortunately most comment in the media has 
concentrated upon the proposed boundaries of the 
unitary authorities: in particular claims that these 
have been drawn so as to maximise the 
Conservatives' electoral advantage. This has 
overshadowed any discussion of the impact of the 
reform legislation upon service provision. 
An earlier article in the Quarterly Economic 
Commentary (Hayton, 1992) considered the likely 
impact of reform upon local economic development. 
This was written at a time when the details of the 
economic development power were not known. 
The publication of the Reform Bill (Local 
Government etc (Scotland) Bill) in late 1993 means 
that the present article is able to look in greater 
detail at the power and compare it with the English 
and Welsh legislation. This enables its likely 
impact to be considered. The starting point is to 
look at the background to the legislation. 
The Background To The Power's Introduction 
In the mid-1980s the Conservative Government was 
increasingly concerned about the activities of a 
number of English local authorities. They were felt 
to be promoting local economic development 
policies on a large scale that were in direct conflict 
with the Government's political and economic 
philosophy. These authorities were typified by 
most of the metropolitan counties and the Greater 
London Council (GLC) which had set up enterprise 
boards. They were funded by the authorities using 
their discretionary powers and were attempting to 
promote ambitious plans for the economic 
restructuring of their areas. This resulted in direct 
intervention in the local economies and attempts to 
influence the private sector at a time when 
Government policy stressed the role of the market 
and saw the public sector, in particular local 
government, as having a limited or non-existent role 
in the implementation of economic policy. 
Despite the abolition of the metropolitan counties 
and the GLC in 1986 this did not lead to the 
enterprise boards being wound up. Most were able 
to continue with support from the district councils. 
Arguably the boards' success in surviving abolition 
resulted in the 1989 Act containing 2 specific 
economic development measures. 
The first of these was the introduction of a specific 
economic development power, brought in under 
Section III of the Act. This caused 2 main 
problems for local government:-
a) a specific economic development power 
meant that the discretionary powers to 
incur expenditure, chiefly under Section 
137 of the 1972 Local Government Act 
(which had been used to fund the boards), 
could no longer be used for economic 
development purposes; and 
b) the legislation allowed the respective 
Secretaries of State in England and Wales 
to impose a wide variety of restrictions, 
through secondary legislation, upon the use 
to which the power could be put. 
The outcome was that economic development could 
potentially be very tightly controlled by Central 
Government which now had the ability to legislate 
against individual authorities and particular 
activities if it so wished. 
The second specific measure, introduced under Part 
V of the Act, was a range of controls aimed at 
restricting local government's involvement in 
companies. One interpretation is that this was an 
attempt to kill the enterprise boards once and for 
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all. Most of the boards took action to circumvent 
the legislation and most still remain, albeit that they 
have been restructured and generally operate on a 
smaller scale (Brayshaw, 1990). Those that were 
wound up were generally the victims of the 
inability of the district council funders to agree 
amongst themselves. Yet ironically this section of 
the Act has not been implemented largely, it would 
seem, because the legislation proved impossible to 
frame without affecting many other corporate 
bodies. 
Whilst this legislation was being introduced in 
England and Wales there was little action in 
Scotland. In part this reflected the conservative 
nature of many Scottish local authorities whose 
economic development activities were neither high 
profile nor seen as a challenge to Central 
Government policy. The relatively harmonious 
nature of Scottish central-local government relations 
in the 1980s undoubtedly also played a part as did 
the fact that, at a time when Government policy 
was against direct economic intervention, Scotland 
had, in the Scottish Development Agency, an arm 
of Central Government whose remit was exactly 
that. These factors meant that economic 
development legislation was not a major issue in 
Scotland until recently when local government 
reform came to the fore. 
The Justification For The Economic 
Development Power 
The reform legislation is not merely about 
introducing unitary authorities. It is also an attempt 
to make changes in local government's powers and 
responsibilities. The economic development 
proposals are similar to those introduced in the 
1989 Act. However the apparent justification is 
more difficult to discern largely as the messages 
coming out of the various Government publications 
are contradictory. 
In the Second Consultation Paper on reform the 
possibility of introducing legislation was justified by 
reference to the creation of Scottish Enterprise and 
the Local Enterprise Companies (LECs). It was 
argued that they had very similar responsibilities to 
local government so that there was overlap and 
duplication in service provision. Legislation, it was 
claimed, would "help to delineate the respective 
responsibilities of local authorities and other 
publicly-funded organisations" (The Scottish Office, 
1992, p. 62). Following this logic through would 
imply that local authority activities such as business 
development and training would have been under 
threat, these being the LECs' main areas of interest. 
However when the White Paper appeared the 
overlap and duplication arguments seemed to have 
disappeared. The Paper stated that the power would 
cover all of the activities that local government was 
presently involved in (The Scottish Office, 1993a, 
p. 11). If this is accepted at face value then the 
justification for introducing the power seems rather 
obscure. One interpretation is that it is merely a 
measure of administrative tidiness: to bring Scottish 
authorities in line with those in England and Wales. 
However more cynical interpretations are possible. 
The Economic Development Power 
Unlike the English and Welsh legislation the 
economic development power is to be introduced as 
an amendment to existing legislation, the 1973 
Scottish Local Government Act, with additional 
clauses 171 A, B and C being inserted. The 
legislation is almost identical to that introduced 
under the 1989 Act with minor but potentially 
significant differences. 
The power in both the Act and the Bill is very 
wide, allowing authorities to take "such steps as 
they may from time to time consider appropriate for 
promoting the economic development of their area". 
The important point to note is that the power is still 
discretionary, there being no requirement for 
authorities to provide an economic development 
service if they do not consider this to be 
appropriate. The power specifically allows 
authorities to provide financial and other assistance 
to set up or expand commercial, industrial or public 
undertakings which are in the authorities' areas or 
will increase employment opportunities for residents 
of these areas. Financial assistance is defined in 
some detail covering such things as grants, loans, 
guarantees and equity. The main differences in the 
wording between the Scottish and English and 
Welsh legislation seem to reflect attempts to tidy 
and tighten up the power rather than anything more 
substantive. For example the 1989 Act gives the 
Secretaries of State powers to impose restrictions 
upon the provision of financial assistance under 
Section 33. Section 34 contains additional wide 
ranging restrictive powers. There seems to be no 
need for such duplication and indeed it does not 
exist in the Scottish Bill where Section 171B 
contains a general power to allow restrictions to be 
imposed. Additional restrictions are not included in 
Section 171A which defines financial support. 
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The English and Welsh Economic Development 
Restrictions 
The 1989 Act, like the Scottish Bill, allows the 
respective Secretaries of State to impose whatever 
restrictions they want upon the use of the power 
through secondary legislation. This has been a 
trend in recent years, with wide ranging powers 
being introduced through primary legislation which 
can then be restricted at a later date. A cynical 
interpretation might be that secondary legislation is 
likely to face less Parliamentary scrutiny. As such 
this approach gives the Government of the day the 
ability to be far more restrictive than might be the 
case if all the restrictions were included in the main 
act. This wide scope for imposing restrictions 
under the 1989 Act led many commentators to 
speculate that it would have a major impact upon 
economic development. In the event, when the 
regulations were published, the restrictions were 
relatively innocuous (Secretary of State for the 
Environment, et al, 1990). They fell into three 
categories, restrictions on :-
a) involvement in certain activities such as 
newspaper publishing, trading in goods and 
services and manufacturing; 
b) authorities giving financial support to any 
individual company in excess of £10,000 
a year unless they had above average 
unemployment levels or included within 
their boundaries areas eligible for Central 
Government support; and 
c) providing such financial support as wages 
subsidies. 
However the impact of the restrictions was 
minimised by a variety of exemptions. For 
example trading and manufacturing was allowed if 
this was carried out as an adjunct to training, whilst 
wages subsidies could be given if they were to help 
the unemployed get back into work. Even the 
restriction upon financial support affected only 38% 
of authorities, most of which were in suburban 
areas in the south east of England where 
unemployment was not a major issue. The outcome 
was that the restrictions seem to have been rather a 
non-event. Certainly they have not had the 
detrimental impact upon local government's 
economic development service that was predicted. 
Despite this the potential still remains in the 
legislation for more draconian restrictions to be 
introduced. It therefore may be a mistake to be too 
complacent and assume that the Scottish restrictions 
will be equally harmless. 
The Scottish Economic Development Restrictions 
What form the Scottish restrictions will take 
remains to be seen. However the White Paper 
indicated that these would be used for 2 purposes, 
both of which related more to the provision of 
information than restrictions as such (The Scottish 
Office, 1993a, p. 11). These were :-
a) providing information to the Scottish 
Office, as required by European 
legislation, about financial support given to 
companies; and 
b) a requirement upon authorities to consult 
about their economic development plans. 
Of the 2 the consultation requirement is potentially 
the most significant and is considered further below. 
Yet neither requirement seems particularly 
restrictive. However the Bill, following the 1989 
Act, gives the Secretary of State very wide powers 
to impose restrictions. These could be aimed at 
individual authorities, particular types of assistance, 
the amount of money spent upon particular 
activities, total spending upon economic 
development or any combination of these. 
Potentially the Bill could be very restrictive and it 
may be that the financial limits that could be 
imposed under section 17IB (3) could turn out to 
be the key restriction should the Scottish Office 
decide to impose it. 
At the moment much economic development 
spending is justified under Section 83 of the 1973 
Scottish Local Government Act. There is therefore 
a limit upon total economic development spending 
under this Section. This will no longer apply when 
the Bill is enacted. Potentially more resources 
could be spent upon economic development if the 
unitary authorities see this as a priority. The 
arguments put forward about overlap and 
duplication by the Scottish Office in the course of 
the reform debate may mean that this would not be 
looked upon favourably. Accordingly it may be 
that restrictions will be imposed upon all 
authorities, limiting their economic development 
spending to a per capita sum somewhat below that 
which presently applies to Section 83. As such the 
financial freedom that the power potentially gives 
authorities to raise resources through Grant Related 
Expenditure may be more apparent than real. 
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Spending upon economic development under a 
specific power may therefore prove to be more 
constrained than is presently the case. 
Consultation 
In the 1989 Act local authorities who were 
providing an economic development service were 
obliged, under Section 35, to produce an economic 
development statement. In effect an economic 
development plan, it was to include :-
a) the authority's economic development 
proposals; 
b) the financial implications of these; and 
c) the objectives that the proposals were 
intended to achieve. 
The plan was then to be used as the basis for 
consultation with the local business and commercial 
community and other interested parties. 
There seems likely to be a similar requirement in 
Scotland. However this will be set out in 
regulations rather than being defined in the primary 
legislation, with Section 17 IB (2) rather unusually 
indicating that this may be a specific requirement. 
As argued above, as secondary legislation may be 
subject to less scrutiny, this could mean that the 
Scottish consultation requirements could be made 
more onerous than those applicable in the rest of 
Great Britain. Yet until this legislation is published 
it is impossible to know how, if at all, the Scottish 
consultation requirements will differ from those 
introduced in England and Wales. 
The consultation requirements could also result in 
a major anomaly in Scottish public sector funded 
economic development. The indication in the 
White Paper was that one of the key consultees 
would be the LECs (The Scottish Office, 1993a, p. 
11). The local authorities, which according to one 
estimate spend £90 million annually on economic 
development (McQuaid, 1992), could be required to 
consult about their economic development 
expenditure plans and objectives. The LECs, which 
are essentially public bodies given that all their 
funds come from the state, will still be allowed to 
prepare their business plans in secrecy, having no 
need to discuss their contents with anyone outside 
of the Scottish Enterprise network. The network's 
1994/5 budget is £452 million, making the anomaly 
even more glaring. This is however all part of the 
trend to give the network greater influence over 
local government whilst itself being sheltered from 
public scrutiny both by claims of "commercial 
confidentiality" and the LECs' legal status as private 
companies. There are parallels with other local 
authority services. For example, the LECs are 
afforded a similar ability to influence the planning 
system, with The Scottish Office stating that LEC 
priorities may mean that local authorities need to 
consider alterations to existing plans (The Scottish 
Office, 1993b, p.13). 
This could be interpreted as part of the gradual 
process of privatisation, with the private sector-led 
LECs being given greater control over some local 
authority services. A more realistic interpretation is 
that this represents centralisation. The Scottish 
Office is able to exert greater control over certain 
services which are effectively removed, either 
totally or in part, from local authorities and given to 
bodies such as the LECs which it directly funds and 
indirectly controls. The outcome is that an 
increasing number of decisions that were previously 
taken by local government are removed from public 
scrutiny. These decisions are then taken by people 
who are non-elected, either self appointed or 
appointed by the Secretary of State according to 
obscure criteria, and who are not answerable for 
their actions to those who are ultimately affected by 
them. Accordingly local government reform may 
see the formalisation of two parallel local states: 
unitary authorities that are expected to be open in 
their activities over and above the transparency that 
the democratic system has inherent in it; and bodies 
such as the LECs which are totally funded by The 
Scottish Office and yet are allowed to prepare and 
implement their plans without any need to consult, 
being answerable only to Central Government. The 
economic development power's consultation 
requirements seem to be a clear step on the way to 
formalising this dual system. 
The Scope of the Legislation 
The economic development power introduced in the 
1989 Act affected only one other piece of 
legislation, Section 137 of the 1972 Local 
Government Act. As this can only be used to 
support activities for which no specific legislation 
exists it could no longer be used for economic 
development purposes. The same situation will 
apply in Scotland where Section 83 of the 1973 
Scottish Local Government Act will not be able to 
be used to justify economic development funding. 
The English Act did not affect any other legislation. 
This meant that it might have been possible for 
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other Acts to have been used for economic 
development purposes which would have not fallen 
within the scope of the restrictions (Hayton, 1991, 
p. 34). This apparent loophole appears to have 
been plugged in the Scottish Bill. The Section 
171A power and the Section 171B restrictions, 
whatever form they eventually take, will affect 3 
other pieces of legislation:-
a) Section 7 of the 1964 Local Government 
(Development and Finance) (Scotland) 
Act, which is a power to provide finance 
for building construction; 
b) Sections 102 and 109 of the 1972 Town 
and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 
which allow authorities to purchase land 
compulsorily and by agreement in 
connection with development, 
redevelopment and improvement for 
planning purposes; and 
c) Sections 70, 74 and 78 of the 1973 Local 
Government (Scotland) Act which give 
powers for land acquisition and disposal 
and building construction. 
This means that potentially the restrictions, be they 
upon the amount of money spent or upon types of 
activities, could affect activities that have no 
relevance to economic development. For example 
under Section 102 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act money might be spent on land 
purchase to provide replacement open space in 
pursuit of environmental and town planning 
objectives. Such activity would however, if the Bill 
is enacted in its present form, now fall within the 
scope of the economic development legislation. If, 
as has been argued above, this had a financial limit 
attached to it then, regardless of departmental 
budget allocations, it might be that planning 
activities would be restricted because money was 
already committed up to the limit on activities that 
had economic development objectives. Given this, 
whilst the Scottish legislation may be attempting to 
remove some of the anomalies apparent in the 1989 
Act, it may be creating a totally new area where 
there is considerable potential for confusion and 
inter-departmental conflict. 
Restrictions Upon Local Authority Involvement 
In Companies 
Arguably one of the main justifications for the 
English and Welsh economic development 
legislation was to restrict local authority 
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involvement in companies, especially the enterprise 
boards. At the time of writing (March 1994) the 
Bill contains nothing about controls upon companies 
in which local authorities have interests. English 
experience indicates that such controls are very 
difficult to frame without infringing the Companies 
Acts and affecting many activities, such as 
partnership ventures, which have been encouraged 
by Central Government. Despite this it has been 
suggested that the Bill be amended so that council-
owned companies could be more easily monitored 
(The Herald, 1994, p. 10). This move has been 
provoked by claims that companies controlled by 
Monklands District Council have made losses of £6 
million over 3 years. Regardless of the validity of 
such claims English experience shows that 
translating political objectives into legislation when 
this affects company law is very difficult to do. As 
such it seems unlikely that, even if amendments are 
made, they stand much chance of being 
implemented. 
Conclusions 
In the earlier article upon this subject it was argued 
that economic development was one of the few 
areas in local government where authorities could 
still exercise innovation and initiative (Hayton, 
1992, p.60). This, it was claimed, was because the 
service was not tightly defined by statute and had 
been able to develop using open ended legislation, 
in particular Section 83. This lack of a specific 
legislative base is set to change. Whether this 
results in a less effective economic development 
service remains to be seen. Optimists can look to 
England and Wales and see that a similar power 
does not seem to have had any great impact. 
Pessimists would no doubt argue that there are 
considerable differences between England and 
Wales and Scotland. In particular the Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs) have a more restricted 
role than the LECs. The latter have a specific 
economic development remit and therefore can be 
seen as directly duplicating some of the activities 
that local government is involved in. Indeed in any 
speculation about the impact of the power it needs 
to be borne in mind that TECs are not LECs. As 
such, comparisons with experience elsewhere may 
be of limited validity. 
This comes back to the original claims in the 
Second Consultation Paper about the delineation of 
the responsibilities of the various economic 
development "actors" through the introduction of 
economic development legislation. Such delineation 
could only be realistically done by restricting local 
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government's activities. If such restrictions are not 
now to be imposed than it is difficult to see the 
reason for introducing the power. In England and 
Wales there was a legitimate political concern that 
local authorities' economic development activities 
were contrary to Central Government's policies. No 
such concerns have been voiced in Scotland. As 
such the power must be either a piece of legislative 
tidying up, as indicated above, or an attempt to 
control local authorities' economic development 
activities. 
Indications in the White Paper point to the former 
interpretation. Yet it is hard to accept this. Why 
go to the trouble and eventual expense of 
introducing legislation merely to bring Scotland into 
line with English and Welsh practice? Given this, 
the message from this article is to advise caution 
and not to accept the White Paper's comments about 
the scope of the restrictions at face value. There 
should be no surprise when the secondary 
legislation finally appears, at a time when the 
unitary system is in the throes of establishing itself 
and the fate of a minor service such as economic 
development is not of any great public concern, if 
it is far more restrictive than the White Paper 
indicated. This would be but one more step on the 
road towards greater centralisation as local 
government's role as a service provider is restricted 
in favour of the less open and far less accountable 
LECs. The introduction of a specific economic 
development power may therefore coincide with a 
diminution of the local authority economic 
development service. Such a change may be 
perfectly justified. However it is being carried out 
without any public examination of strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing system and certainly 
little open debate about the system that may be 
introduced by stealth to replace it. In this the 
changes proposed to economic development are a 
microcosm of the whole Scottish local government 
reform process. 
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